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In a discussion of the pre-revolutionary Iranian labour movement
between 1965-75 two general assumptions prevail. One is that industrial
labour did not make any attempt to organize itself into independent
labour unions (trade unions, etc). The second is that the failure of
labourers to organize themselves was due to the political repression under
the Shah.' In this article, and by way of a preliminary analysis, I would like
to argue: a) assumptions are only partly true; b) that by themselves they
misrepresent the position of Iranian labour in the decade 1965-75,
and c) that the assumptions are based upon a problematic theoretical
premise which establishes a necessary link between political conditions
(freedom control) and labour activities (organization/non-organization).
This postulates that labour activities are determined by the political
conditions. I suggest that the relationship between the two is only con-
tingent, and that other factors must be sought to account for the nature of
labour activities.2 By discussing these issues I hope to cast some new light
on the recent history of Iranian labour.
ACCUMULATION PROCESS AND LABOUR
Let us begin by posing a basic question. Although it is undeniable that in
Iran free and independent labour organization was prohibited by the
state, why is it that the manufacturing labour force failed to set up any
underground labour organization, as its counterparts did in Rhodesia in
the 1920s, in Bolivia under the military dictatorships or in Chile under the
Pinochet dictatorship?3
To start with, there is no adequate historical research on the conditions
of Iranian labour between 1965 and 1975. The limited works available on
labour unionism have focused on the 1946-53 period, the peak of trade
union activism in Iranian history. These include the works of F. Halliday,
E. Abrahamian, W. Floor, H. Lajcvardi, as well as the historical docu-
ments on labour, compiled by Kh. Caqueri.41 must therefore, rely on my
own rather scanty oral history materials collected in 1980-81 in Iran.5
In dealing with the question some would argue that the degree of
repression in Iran under the Shah was much higher and the mechanism of
control much more sophisticated than those in the dictatorial regimes
named above; in other words, that the political control in Iran was
peculiar. First, we should be precise in the application of the term
repression. 'A repressive state' generally denotes a state which imposes
sanctions of various kinds of those fragments on society which disagree
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with it. The term, meanwhile, is employed to refer to different kinds and
degrees of control exerted at the societal level. Repressive states differ
from each other, I suggest, in terms of a) the degree of tolerance of (or the
severity of punishment against) the opposition; b) the extent and the area
of opposition (e.g. whether the state is against all groups or classes, or one
particular group or class; c) the ideology of domination and means of
justification. On this account, one could argue that the Islamic state in
Iran is more repressive than the one under the Shah, and yet the industrial
working class, in my view, has had more room for industrial action under
the latter regime than under the former. This is because of the revo-
lutionary experience that the working class went through, and because the
Islamic state's populism and 'anti-imperialism' gives legitimacy to the
militant activities of the workers.
Secondly, the argument which relies on the peculiarity of the Shah's
repression is problematic because, as I shall demonstrate later, labour
activism in industry did grow in the early and mid-1970s when the very
same repressive state of the Shah was still dominant.
I suggest that the reason for the non-existence of the independent and
viable labour unionism in the decade 1965-75 is related not simply to the
State's political control, but to the rapid process of capital accumulation
since the mid-1960s, exemplified in the particular nature of the agrarian
reform launched in the mid-1960s, rapid pace of industrial expansion and
of the working-class formation.
During the decade under discussion capital accumulation and indus-
trialization accelerated. This process involved, on the one hand, imple-
mentation of the strategy of import substitution, resulting in the expansion
of mainly light capital-intensive manufacturing industries in the major
urban centres: Tehran, Karadj, Qazvin, Isfahan, Shiraz, Khuzistan, etc.
The new wave of industrialization was the result of combined attempts of
foreign captial, indigenous private capital and especially the state. Thanks
to the monopoly control over the oil income and informed by an ideology
of capitalist modernization, the state became the major instigator of
industrialization through the provision of infrastructure and development
planning, by fiscal politics and direct involvement. The five-year plans
provided the general framework for economic development. Very sub-
stantial economic development was achieved during the Third Plan
(1962-67). The Third Plan envisaged a 7.4 per cent growth rate and
achieved a constant price growth of 8.6 per cent. The Fourth Plan aimed
for 9.4 per cent growth and achieved an average of 12.5 per cent. During
the Fourth Plan, and before the major increase in oil prices, the industrial
sector grew at an average 13 per cent rate.6 The oil price increase in 1973
boosted the annual revenue from $817 millions in 1968 to $2.25 billion in
1972-73 to nearly $20 billion in 1976-77. The Fifth Plan (1973-78), thus
contemplated an initial growth rate of 15 percent, but due to the massive
oil income, was revised to triple gross product during the period. Actual
growth for 1973 and 1974 was respectively 32 and 42 per cent. As two
economists observed, 'Quite literally, every company in Iran, public and
private, had enormous investment plans on the drawing board, heavily
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dependent on imported equipment and material'.7 These developments
meant that the demand for labour had grown enormously.
The accumulation process, on the other hand, involved a fundamental
transformation in the production relations in the rural areas. The Land
Reform Programme which the state launched in the mid-1960s altered the
pre-capitalist relations in agriculture; land was distributed on an unequal
basis, thus stratifying the rural population within the context of new
(commodity) relations. As a result, over J of the peasants' households
(800,000) obtained less than one hectare of land, and some 75 per cent less
than 6 hectares.* As these desperate landless peasants and smallholders
were integrated into the cash economy, the home market developed and
the rural population became the consumers of the manufactured goods
produced in the rapidly growing industrial urban centres. A massive free
and raw labour supply had been created. The pressure of 'push factors' in
the countryside - loss of land, unemployment, low income and especially
the increasing need for cash to meet the demand of the expanding
commodity market - combined with the rapid industrial growth in the
major cities to induce rapid urban migration. Despite the existence of the
pre-land-reform out-rural migration (250,000 a year between 1957-60)
due mainly to 'push factors', post-land-reform accumulation dramatically
accelerated the urban migration. Between 1967 and 1976 some 330,000
people migrated into the cities each year.9 The major cities experienced
substantial rates of growth by the high rate of migration. The migrants
accounted for as much as 50 per cent of the increase in the urban
population during 1966-76.'°
Such a 'freed' labour, however, was on the one hand excessive to the
needs of the capital-intensive industrialization. The excessive supply of
raw labour meant a growth of urban unemployment and expansion of the
'informal sector'. Furthermore, this massive labour was by and large
unskilled. As a result, supply of massive unskilled labour combined with a
dire need for skilled labour in the rapidly growing 'formal sector' of the
economy forced the employers to recruit mostly unskilled rural labour
with the hope of paying lower wages and training them on the job.11
I would suggest that this largely direct employment of rural labour in the
industries had significant implications for the non-organization of labour
in the decades under study. Rural labour diluted the manufacturing
working class after 1965. As new factories were set up, new and mostly
unskilled rural labour was recruited. Since the late 1960s the average
annual growth rate of manufacturing labour was 8 per cent. This figure
was higher in the industrially concentrated cities. We know that, for
instance, in the first nine months of 1969-70 (the Iranian year of 1348)
some 562 new economic units were established in Tehran alone (of which
54 percent were industrial units), while the share of the rest of the country
was 126 units in the same period. In 1970-71 the figures changed to 545 and
164 respectively. '2 Most of the factories I visited in 1980-81 had been set up
in the mid- or late 1960s. This means that the new recruits did not have a
long experience of industrial work, or for that matter, any tradition of
labour activism in industry. In my sample of the Tehran factory workers,
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80 per cent of the workers had come directly from the villages. In one
factory established in 1966, for instance, over 90 per cent of the workers
had less than five years of industrial work in 1975. This finding was
supported by the sample which showed that the fathers of only 7 per cent of
the Tehran factory workers in 1980 were working in industry, although 25
per cent of their fathers were involved in wage-labouring in one form or
another (i.e., in construction, railway and government offices).
Coming from the misery of village life, these workers would view
factory employment in positive terms: in its job security, regular income,
economic betterment, health insurance, fringe benefits and prestige.
Certainly, comparing their present position as factory workers with their
past in unemployment, debt, need for cash, lack of medical services in the
village, they considered themselves to be (and indeed they were) in
relatively privileged positions. These workers, unlike their workmates
with longer industrial service, had in these years little motivation to get
involved in secret activities or organize underground independent labour
unions which would involve a high degree of political risk. Here, one could
even detect among these workers a certain degree of 'rationality' rather
than 'false consciousness'. At the same time, the attitude of these workers
would make the organizing attempts of their fellow and more experienced
workers (the leaders) very difficult. For the agitational activities of the
'leaders' are successful only when they are grasped and supported by the
members of rank and file. In this period, the division between the
experienced and the overwhelmingly 'new workers' was the dominant
feature of factory life. In the Iranian factories the terms Kargar-i Ghadimi
(experienced workers) and Kargar-i Jadid (new workers) are still widely
used. This was clearly an expression of a rift within the working class, and
its negative impact on the organizing activities of the leaders manifested
on many occasions, including the failed strike of the contract workers in
the oil industry in 1975.13
I want to stress here that my argument on the mentality of the
rural labour is different from the prevalent view that regards the rural
immigrants per se as generally conservative, backward looking, petty-
bourgeois, etc. The prevailing view takes the 'peasantry', the class origin
of the immigrant workers, as a homogeneous socio-economic category
which possesses fixed and inscribed ideological characteristics, eg.
adherence to property ownership, individualism, narrow-mindedness, a
belief in the immutable nature of things, etc. However, it is now clear that
'peasantry' is an heterogeneous entity each stratum of which may foster
distinct aspirations. In addition, this ideological/cultural differentiation
can be further diversified according to the regional variation of a country
in terms of historical/cultural development. This cultural background of
particular immigrants may contribute to their militancy in the industry. As
is clear in this article, I provide a specific historical explanation for the
compliance of the migrant workers with factory life in the decade 1965-
By the mid-1970s, however, the industrial setting had changed so that
despite the persistence of the dictatorial state of the Shah, manufacturing
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labour did start to carry out industrial actions. What had happened was
that the manufacturing workers started to acquire a new 'subjectivity' a
major component of which was an 'industrial consciousness'. By this I
mean a consciousness which derived its elements from an industrial
setting, an urban life and industrial work. The workers transcended the
misery of village life and the security of the factory employment with all its
advantages. They were now concerned with the misery of factory life:
factory discipline, wages, condtions of work, housing problems, inflation,
authoritarianism, discrimination, and so on.15
The emerging industrial consciousness in the mid-1960s of workers
who had now acquired skill and industrial familiarity, reflected itself in
both individualistic resistence (e.g. high labour turnover, sabotage) and
collective shop-floor activism (but not yet trade unionism).16 High labour
turnover reflected the individual resistence of the especially skilled
labour-force who were becoming aware of their bargaining power. In 1974
the rate of turnover in multinational corporations ranged from 25 per cent
in textile, 18 per cent in chemicals to 15 per cent in transport equip-
ment plants.17 Despite its recognition in the Labour Law, free collective
bargaining, except in the oil industry, was minimal in the maufacturing
industry; thus these workers resorted to moving from one factory to
another in pursuit of higher pay and better conditions. To remedy this
problem and to ensure a stable skilled labour-force for the future, the
Ministry of Labour introduced the Job Classification Scheme in the early
1970s. The scheme aimed to attract and stabilize skilled labour by creating
an 'internal labour market' in enterprises through promotion, seniority
rules and a bonus system, based on the two principal factors and length of
service.
Shop-floor activism, however, was most clearly demonstrated by
collective action, including strikes. A report suggested that the number of
strikes rose from a'handful in 1971-73 to as many as 20 or 30 per year by
1975'.18 My informal interview with the factory workers in 1980-81
supported the view that industrial actions had spread in the mid-1970s.
Thus, in the Mashin Sazi Plant in Tabriz, an industrial city in the north-
west, 'there was a strike in 1972' stated a worker';' the factory was closed
for ten days. They (the management) wanted to kick us out.... The strike
was on welfare issues, fringe benefits; white-collar workers had 24 days
annual holidays, but we had only 12 days, we also wanted housing benefit
...'. Similar strikes happened in such plants as Iran Transformer, Arj,
Philips, A/.mayesh, Saypa, and Zamyad. On occasions, protests would
take a form of spontaneous riots, as in Arj factory in Tehran in 1976.
It was at noon when we went for lunch. We were given such an
horrible meal that we could hardly eat it. It was a cutlet meal. Then
the lads started throwing them up to the ceiling; then they smashed
the chairs and tables. Later, it was about 3 o'clock when 3-4 para-
military cars entered the factory, they took a few workers and so the
protest was stifled.
My interviews suggested that the industrial actions were not wholly
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spontaneous as is usually claimed." They were organized secretly by more
conscious and more experienced fellow workers. This happened in Saypa,
Katerpillar and Zamyad plants in Tehran. In Mahboobi furniture factory
in Tehran 'we had appointed a lad', described a skilled worker, 'who
would ring a bell three times when a stranger entered the workshop; then
we would pretend to be working; otherwise we would not produce'. In the
Katerpillar factory in Tehran, the experienced workers had 'managed
to form a secret nucleus ... this nucleus would engage in all sons of
political activity here .... If necessary it would also organize in other
factories ...'.20
Indeed, in both periods - 1965-75 and after- such conscious elements
might have been active in giving direction to the resistence of the workers.
Yet, the degree of success in each of these cases depended almost entirely
on the reaction of the mass of the workers. I suggest that in the former
period (1965 to early 1970s) the mass of the workers tended not to respond
to the 'leaders" appeals, while in the second period they did - precisely
because of the change in their subjectivity, and the acquisition of an
'industrial consciousness'.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE-RUN UNIONS
But what was the role of the state-run syndicates in this regard? The
Labour Law did recognize the establishment of the syndicates at the work
places. The encouragment by the state of certain syndicates goes back to
the years of the late 1940s when a nation-wide trade union movement was
organized in the United Central Council of the Unified Trade Unions of
Iranian Workers (CUCTU) under the strong influence of the Tudeh
(Communist) Party. The state initiated setting up new unions as the
alternative labour organizations to the CUCTU. These syndicates grew
from 16 in 1964 to a total of 519 in 1972 spreading through industry and
services.21 The syndicates were to engage in collective bargaining, but
were barred from getting involved in strike actions and political activities.
After the suppression of the CUCTU following the coup of 1953, the state-
run unions were the only labour organizations in the country.
There are two rather conflicting views on these syndicates, and yet both
view them as unproblematic. One view portrays these syndicates as the
typical organizations of the Iranian work-force, functioning in a tripartite
combination of labour, management and state in a seemingly liberal
plural setting.22
On the left, the syndicates were viewed as totally subordinated to the
wishes of the employers or were filled with SAVAK agents. The reality
seems to me quite different. The syndicates under the Shah's regime
exemplified the general contradictory role of the Trade Unions under
capitalism, accommodation and conflict. Yet the Iranian syndicates, in
addition, had the role of scrutinizing the workers' activities. So, on the one
hand, they acted as a mechanism of labour control, channelling labour
discontent into a controllable, peaceful and quick resolution. A SAYPA
factory worker stated during the Shah's reign, 'we did have a syndicate,
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but its activities were very limited. That is, they were never given such a
power as to challenge the employer. That is why they were formally
workers' representatives, but actually the boss's representatives'. In
addition, I found out that in five out of 12 factories investigated, the
'workers' representatives' had been officially employed by SAVAK. One
factory lacked any syndicate leaders. In three, the syndicate leaders,
though not SAVAK agents, had sold out their workers' interests. Three
others were militant and loyal to their rank and life interests. This latter
point leads us to the other dimension of the syndicates. The workers used
the syndicates, as far as possible, as a legal means to materialize their
demands. In this way they changed the nature of the state-run unions.
Thus, in the 1970s, in Mashin Sazi Plant in Tabriz, 'Mr. Alibadi was a
militant member of the syndicate who was even jailed [for his trade union
activities]'. In Zagros plant in Tehran 'the leader, dabeer, of the syndicate
was dismissed before his term ended; because he would do some good
things for the workers'.23
It must be stressed that workers' attempts to convert the State-run
syndicates into their own interests could not and did not lead to the
institutionalization of the independent labour activities under the Shah's
regime. They were bound to be ad hoc. The state-run unions, thus, were
overwhelmingly contained, ineffective and had the role of controlling
labour. It is precisely for this reason that labour activism in the early and
mid-1970s was carried out by and large outside the official union structure.
Perhaps, an alternative independent labour organization was at the start
of its making when a new era began with the advent of the revolution of
1978-79.
Instead of providing conditions for the development of labour unionism
(in the form of trade unions or industrial unions), the revolution inter-
rupted that process. Among the twentieth-century major revolutions, the
Iranian one is of the unique cases in which the post-revolutionary era did
not experience a development of trade unions, but of organizations more
advanced than the unions. In Russia, Chile and Portugal, revolutions led
to the emergence of both trade unions and the organs of workers'
control. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the revolutions in
Cuba, Mozambique and Nicaragua, it was by and large the unions that
extensively flourished.24 In Iran, however, not the trade unions but the
shuras or workers' councils with a strong control-oriented tendency,
sprang up in the industrial work-places. The reason for this is related a) to
the lack of an independent union organization (we have already discussed
why); b) to the workers' unpleasant experience with the State-run unions
under the Shah (in my interviews no worker was in favour of organizing
syndicates), and c) to an acquisition by the workers of a particular form of
control-oriented consciousness, the 'ideology of possession'. The latter
was based upon the feeling among the workers that 'we have struggled to
defeat the past, so we have the right to determine the future'.
The councils were the organizational embodiment of a strong desire
among the work-force to exert control over the processes of production
and administration of production. They were the work-place organiza-
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lions which aimed to exert control over the management and democratize
the work environment. Thus, the activities of the councils transcended
those of the existing labour unions or work-place syndicates whose
concerns do not usually go beyond the matters of wages and conditions of
work. In day-to-day activities, the councils were concerned not only with
wages and working conditions, but also with matter of employment,
dismissal, production, pricing, procurement and investment.23
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
During 1965-75 the Iranian manufacturing labour lacked an independent
organization. Much of the existing literature on the Iranian labour
history tend to be 'political-reductionist' in that they attribute the non-
organization of the labour force in this decade to the political control of the
Shah's regime: the state's repression hindered any form of independent
labour organization.
The proposition seems to be problematic at both empirical and
theoretical levels. As we discussed in this article, political factors alone
cannot provide an adequate explanation, for the simple reason that labour
force did engage itself in shop-floor activism later in the mid-1970s when
still the same, if not harsher, political control prevailed.
On the other hand, such political reductionism poses some important
theoretical problems of which one can generalize the implications. In the
first place, it implies a zero-sum relation between the power of the state
and the organization of political activities in general and of labour
in particular: when the state is strong, the opposition to it (including
labour organization) is weak or non-existent; and when the state is
weak the opposition strong. Goran Therborn has satisfactorily argued
that such a conclusion is unjustifiable.26 In the second place, political
reductionism rests upon an assumption which establishes a necessary link
between political conditions (freedom/resriction) and labour activities
(organization/non-organization). Thus, it is taken for granted that in the
absence of a political restriction, the labour-force will automatically
organize itself independently. We argued that the link between political
conditions and labour activities is only contingent. The relationship is
mediated, I would suggest, by the form of workers' consciousness, the
degree of organizational tradition, leadership quality, and the extent of
corporate ideology.
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In a given capitalist social formation, the political democracy in broad
economics is determined, I propose, by two fundamental factors: the degree
of capitalist development and the extent of class struggle. Specifically, the
more hegemonic capital is, the more likely it is that the state would take
a democratic political form. The reason is that an advanced capital has the
capability to accommodate the anti-capitalist and democratic struggles of
the working class and other democratic forces. On the other hand, where
a weak capital operates, as in the backward capitalist countries of the Third
World, the state tends to assume a despotic character. Yet, it does not
follow that the backward capitalist societies are doomed to be dominated
by despotism. The balance of forces in the political arena may change and
be maintained in favor of democracy if the subordinated classes are able
to resist the undemocratic policies of the state and if they set limits upon
the arbitrary functions of the state by organizing in such mass institutions
as labor unions, professional societies, and associations of women, students,
and the intelligentsia. Historically, the labor movement has played a major
role in bringing about a democratic balance among the social forces.'
In a market economy, the relationship between the labor movement and
democracy occurs in one of two forms. The first type, "immediate relations,"
refers to a situation in which labor is assumed to be a powerful economic
institution united in a single national organ and capable of imposing its
political demands upon the state through changing the balance of forces
in society in favor of democratic processes and practices. Historical evidence
in Europe suggests that "formal," or "bourgeois," democracy developed as
a result of the continued anti-capitalist struggles of organized labor.2 Similarly,
The author would like to thank the editors for their comments and suggestions on earlier
drafts of this chapter.
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in Bolivia (a backward capitalist country), a very strong labor movement
has, since the 1952 Revolution, forced the return to periodic representative
governments following each military coup.'
The second type, "mediated relation," refers to the labor movement-
democracy relationship in which labor seeks to implement a strategy of
"economic democracy" through a transformation of the authoritarian division
of labor in the workplace. Such a strategy, if sustained, can provide conditions
for extending and consolidating democratic institutions and traditions that
may lead to political democracy. Because this strategy presupposes the
institutionalization of accountability, criticism, and direct involvement, it
would tend to lead to a new conception of power relations. The institution
of economic democracy, then, requires, for its reproduction, a certain degree
of democratization at the level of the state institutions and political decision-
making. The Yugoslav self-management system, for instance, is certainly
a crucial factor in determining the relatively democratic character of the
state in that country in comparison to the other Eastern European countries.
In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between the labor movement
and democracy in Iran after the Revolution. Both "immediate" and "mediated"
aspects are considered. By the "labor movement" in revolutionary Iran, I
mean largely the "workers' councils" or Shurahs. The latter were an
organizational manifestation of the strong desire on the part of the working
classes in both industry and the service sectors to exert control over
production and the administration of production.4
In referring to "democracy" in a capitalist social formation, I point to
both the "macro" level (e.g., as political democracy) and the "micro" level
(perceived as grassroots democracy). The former concept broadly defines
a political system in which the state's policies are determined by the citizens
of the given country through a mechanism of representation. To make such
a system reality, certain types of political freedoms (e.g., freedom of
expression, assembly, and political organization) have to be presupposed.
Democracy at the "micro" level refers to the way in which the policies of
certain economic and social institutions (e.g., industry, educational systems,
and neighborhoods) are determined from below by direct involvement of
the people.
Labor Struggles, 1978-1982
In the course of the revolutionary upheavals in Iran that led to the downfall
of the monarchy in February 1979, labor struggles mounted and developed
in two successive stages. The first stage, October 1978 to February 1979,
was characterized by a wave of mass strikes, and the second stage, from
February 1979 to July 1982, by the emergence and development of the
labor council movement.
Mass Strikes, 1978-1979
Following massive street demonstrations in the urban centers and the oil
strike in October 1978, workers' strikes spread rapidly throughout offices
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and industry, in both the state and the private sectors.b By January 1979
the entire urban working class, including white-collar and blue-collar workers,
had put down their tools. The strike movement culminated in the general
strike during the Bakhtiar government. Both wage earners and small-business
people helped to halt all major economic activities.
The strikes by the industrial working class had already begun as early
as May 1978. Initially, the demands of the strikers were overwhelmingly
economic. They changed gradually into political demands, however (although
some retained their economic form), directed not to limited and immediate
economic objectives but to long-term political goals. In particular, the strikers
aimed at dismantling the political order by inflicting economic wounds on
the regime. By October 1978, some 45 percent of the demands of the
strikers were political, reaching 80 percent in November and 100 percent
in February.6 Although the industrial working class as an organized force
entered the political scene later than the urban masses, the workers as
individuals had already been present in the street demonstrations. It was
not until October that the industrial working class, alongside the state
employees, started to organize concerted strike actions by creating strike
committees in the industrial workplace.
For the most part, the strike committees were led by militant workers
with three distinct backgrounds: experienced secular trade unionists, worker
activists linked to anti-monarchy religious circles, and militant workers with
leftist tendencies. The organization of the strike committees was largely
decentralized, and their day-to-day affairs were directed neither by a national
coordinating body nor by the official leadership of the revolution based in
Paris. At times, the strike committees came into conflict with Ayatollah
Khomeini's representatives or the religious leaders inside the country over
matters concerning the handling of strike policies (e.g., the case of the
committees in railway, oil, and customs). In the days immediately following
the Revolution, it was these strike committees that, to some degree, provided
the institutional bases for the organization of the council movement to which
I turn below.
The Council Movement, 1979-1982
The second stage of the workers' movement was identified with the
development of workers' councils after the Revolution. The councils con-
stituted the organizational embodiment of a strong desire in the workforce
to exert control over both the processes and the administration of production.
They formed the workplace organizations that aimed to extend the control
of labor over the organization of production, limit the authority of management,
and democratize the work environment. Thus the activities of the councils
transcended those of the typical labor unions or workplace syndicates, whose
concerns did not usually go beyond matters of wages and conditions of
work. In their day-to-day activities, the councils were concerned not only
with wages and working conditions but also with matters of employment
and dismissal, production, pricing, procurement, and investment.
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Structurally, the workers' council is normally seen as an administrative
apparatus, or as a directly elected body of workers who, as members of
the "executive committee," are assigned by the assembly of employees to
carry out the tasks specified in the councils' constitutions or demanded
directly by the workers. To be more precise, a council should be viewed
not merely as an administrative apparatus but as a totality encompassing
the employees, the structure of power delegation, and control-oriented
practices, and the rationale that governs the structure and practices in the
workplace.
In the first six months after the Revolution, a form of "control from
below" prevailed in the workplace through the mediation of the labor councils,
which took part in decision-making processes or set into motion and ran
the enterprises whose owners or managers had fled the country or had gone
underground. The political and economic consolidation of the Islamic state
gradually undermined the real power of the secular councils, and the system
of one-man management from above was once again reintroduced.
Workers' councils emerged alongside other popular and grass-roots organs
such as district committees, peasants' councils (in the northern provinces),
employees' councils within the state administration, and councils of cadets
in the air force. The factory councils, however, were more widespread and
survived longer than the other organs.
Why did the councils emerge? The concept of such councils had no
precedent in the historical experience of contemporary Iranian laborers. The
experience of "council societies" (Anjomanhaye Shuraii), which emerged in
some northern cities and among the urban people during the Constitutional
Revolution (1905-1907), existed too long ago to be remembered by the
present generation of industrial laborers.7 Nor did the idea come from
without—that is, from the political groups (left, secular, or religious). Only
after the Shurahs had been organized by the workers themselves did the
political groups propagate them and provide them with a loosely structured
theoretical framework. In this connection, the Left political groups tended
to wrongly conceive of the Shurahs as similar to the soviets that emerged
during the Russian Revolution. The latter, unlike factory councils, were bodies
that went beyond the workplace, representing not only the workers but also
peasants and soldiers, and whose concern was mainly political. Relying on
two ayats from the Quran, the ideologies of the Islamic Republic party (1RP)
attempted to establish a Quranic origin for the Shurahs.6 The IRP also
wanted to change the notion of Shuraism as being exclusive to the Marxists
whose ideological ideas about the councils predominated over those of other
political organizations at that time.
The councils were conjunctural (i.e., time-specific) phenomena. They
resulted from the consolidation of two distinct but interrelated factors. First
was the conjunctural inability of Iranian capitalism to respond positively to
the workers' "defensive" demands—the demands that aimed to preserve
their already acquired gains. This inability of capital was related to the crisis
conditions in which capitalism found itself immediately after the Revolution.
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Specifically, the legitimacy of capitalist rationale and relations had come
into question after the Revolution. Thus, in the aftermath of the insurrection
when Khomeini ordered workers to end their strikes, the large-scale firms
shut down, and industrialists and company owners connected with foreign
capital either went into hiding or fled the country. Furthermore, the supply
of raw materials had come to a halt, there had been no new investments
since the beginning of the widespread strikes in industries, some companies
had gone bankrupt, and many firms refused to continue their operations
until the new state could assure them of favorable business conditions.
Although the provisional government was relatively quick in declaring its
support for private investments, productive capital could not be assured of
political security. This situation prevails even today and has to do with the
peculiar nature of the Islamic state.9
under such conditions, capital was unable to respond to the ordinary
defensive demands of the revolutionized labor force, including payment of
delayed wages, re-employment and job security, and higher pay and benefits.
Together, such demands constituted about 52 percent of the total demands
made.10 This inability of capital provided material conditions for workers to
transcend their defensive demands and resort to offensive direct action:
taking over plants and running them themselves, presiding over the financial
activities of the companies, occupying factories, and so on. These actions
were indeed instances of workers' control, in as much as they were
institutionalized and regulated by the councils. The first five months after
the Revolution witnessed at least 374 industrial incidents: strikes, sit-ins,
protests, demonstrations, occupations, and hostage-takings. These incidents
involved at least 286 large industrial units."
Although a crisis in the capitalist reproduction process is necessary if
workers are to adopt an offensive strategy, it is not by itself sufficient. An
additional factor must be present—namely, the acquisition and development
by the working classes of a new, control-oriented form of consciousness.
Indeed, this new form of consciousness was the product of the revolutionary
crisis. It was based upon the workers' feeling that "we have struggled to
defeat the past, so we have the right to determine the future." Their new
mentality was shaped by all those layers of the population who had participated
actively in the Revolution. Yet each layer tended to give expression to this
consciousness in its own immediate surroundings. For the industrial working
class, it was manifested in the idea and practice of factory Shurahs.
In addition to new economic conditions and this different state of political
consciousness, a third element contributed to the popularity of the Shurahs
as an organizational concept: a power struggle within the provisional gov-
ernment. The "liberals" in the government opposed the formation of the
councils, whereas the Islamic Republic party stepped up its support for
them. The party aimed at dismissing the "liberals" as counterrevolutionary
while presenting itself as a revolutionary alternative (as discussed in the
last section).
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The Council Movement and Democracy
To what extent did the post-revolutionary labor movement—in particular,
the council organizations—contribute to the cause of democracy in Iran?
The issue must be examined in terms of both its immediate implications
and its mediated implications.
Immediate Implications
There is no strong evidence to suggest that the Iranian working class
was involved in direct political struggle for preserving the democratic
achievements of the Revolution beyond the workplaces (i.e., at the societal
level). For instance, we lack evidence of organized opposition by the working
class to government policies concerning freedom of expression, ethnic
minorities, women, and so on. On the other hand, no evidence exists to
indicate that the working class supported these policies either.'? There is,
however, an important exception to this generalization: The pro-IRP supporters
among the working class, organized in the Islamic Shurahs and Islamic
associations, opposed the policies of the provisional government but supported
the government formed by the party.
The absence of effective democratic activities among the working class
at the societal level may be inscribed by two sets of considerations:
sociological/organizational and ideological/political.
Sociological/Organizational Considerations. The working-class organiza-
tions, whether councils or labor syndicates, were never combined in a
nationwide institution. For the most part, they were scattered throughout
the individual workplaces. Only a few attempts were made to unite the
councils on an industrial or regional basis as exemplified by the Union of
the Councils (CJC) of the Industrial units of the Gilan Province, the ÜC of
the Oil Industry, the CJC of the Organization of Industrial Development, the
UC of West Tehran, the UC of East Tehran, and the union of the Contract
and Seasonal Workers of Abadan and Vicinity.
Except for the latter union and the UC of the Oil Industry, which were
involved in political-democratic struggles in Khuzistan province, the scope
and activities of the remaining unions were limited to workplace and economic
issues.
The failure of the working class to unite the councils can be attributed
to three factors. First, workers lacked experience of trade unionism. Political
repression under the Shah had hindered independent trade-union activities.
Some evidence points to the existence of underground trade-union activities
among industrial labor in the early 1970s. Yet it must be stressed that the
hasty pace of class formation since the 1960s set restraints on the scope
of the clandestine trade unionism. To begin with, a large proportion of the
industrial working class was still new to industrial work. In 1980, only 8
percent of factory workers in Tehran came from the industrial working
class, which experienced an annual growth rate of 8 percent. Most of these
workers (80 percent according to my survey) emerged directly from the
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rural areas with no experience of industrial work. Having come from the
misery of village life (which entailed the loss of land, unemployment, and
low income), such workers at least initially viewed factory employment in
positive terms—as a means of job security and economic betterment—and
thus had little motivation to organize secretly. It was only in the latter part
of the 1970s that this new generation started to understand the misery of
factory life and began to acquire a new identity.13
The second reason is related to the structure of council organization. As
the councils were a form of workplace unionism, their common interests
were based neither upon the common skills of, say, printers or engineers
nor upon industrial classification, such as textile work or coal-mining. Third,
the state would oppose any significant attempt by the workers to independently
amalgamate the councils into larger organizations, such as the (JC of the
Organization of the Industrial Development).
Ideological/Political Considerations. Ideological and political factors played
an important part in hindering the active intervention of the workers in the
society-wide democratic struggles that occurred immediately after the Rev-
olution. In this respect, two specific elements could be identified: the populist
policies of the Islamic state, and their untenable political evaluation by the
"traditional Left."
The populist policies of the Islamic state emanate from the unique nature
of the welayat-e faqih ("government of the jurist"). This Islamic form of
the state in Iran is characterized by its conflicts with both the working
class and the bourgeoisie. (I have outlined the origin and unique nature of
the Islamic state in more detail elsewhere.)14 It suffices here to say that the
populist stand of the state played an important part in confusing and dividing
the working class politically. A small but active and privileged section of
the working class identified its interests with those of the state. Organized
in the Islamic associations and the Islamic Shurahs, which were initiated
by the IRP inside the workplace, this group backed the policies of the
regime and formed part of its social/political basis.
Mot only the working class but also a large part of the traditional Left
became confused by the populist, "anti-capitalist," and "pro-downtrodden"
stance of the Islamic state. These leftist groups conceived of the Islamic
state as representing the "interests of the petty bourgeoisie," which they
described as having an "anti-imperialist" political character. Such conceptions
of the state, which informed the political agitations of the left-wing groups,
further confused those workers who leaned toward the Left organizations.
In addition, the Left groups paid little attention to the issue of civil and
democratic rights and liberties, dismissing them as "liberal bourgeois de-
mands."
Mediated Impacts
The labor movement nevertheless contributed to the cause of democracy
through the medium of the councils. This contribution was realized in the
following terms:
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Structure. The councils by their nature were democratic, grass-roots
organs. Their executive committees were directly elected and were subject
to recall, at any time, by the members. The committees were accountable
to general assemblies of employees, and their members were not paid any
extra salary for their positions in the committees. Almost all workers in a
unit would attend the meetings in which heated debates would take place
on issues concerning the running of the workplace. At crucial meetings,
such as the ones concerning the conduct of management, a few officials
from the Ministry of Labor or the "Imam's representatives" would also
attend. The day-to-day activities of the Shurahs, including elections, debates
in general meetings, and operation of the affairs of the enterprise, had a
dramatic impact upon the way the workers conceptualized society, authority,
and their social position in the society at large. Indeed, the workers were
involved in a learning process. To understand the significance of this change,
the reader should recall that, during the last thirty years, democratic
institutions (whether state or nonstate) have been almost totally nonexistent
in Iran. In family and school, in workplace and political organizations, both
open and clandestine, decision making had been basically authoritarian. It
was against such a background of political culture that the councils established
a nascent democratic tradition and culture.
Function. As indicated above, the workers' councils were the organizational
manifestations of the workers' struggle to exert control over the processes
and administration of production. In other words, the workers' councils
tended, in practice, to transform the authoritarian character of power relations
in the workplace by altering the traditional division of labor between functions
of "conception" and "execution." This division signifies a division between
roles and positions involved in decision making on the one hand, and roles
and positions involved in mere implementation of such decisions on the
other. The struggle to alter or modify this division of labor is a fundamentally
democratic act, because it reflects not simply a technical division of labor
between certain employees but, rather, a social division. It points to the
relations of domination and subordination of the workplace.
It must be stressed, however, that the Shurahs were not Soviet-type
organizations, nor could they be an alternative to the Islamic state in pursuit
of a socialist revolution. In broad terms, soviets in Russia represented the
specifically political self-organization of the working class—a self-organization
that transcended anti-capitalist struggles at the point of production and
aimed at controlling the political power.15 The Shurahs in Iran, which
generally resembled the characteristics of the factory committees that
emerged during the Russian Revolution, fought a battle to transform the
despotic and authoritarian power relations that existed in the workplace.
The Shurahs might have become a national political force if they had
survived and combined into a national organization.
The factory councils appeared in five areas within the industrial arena.
1. Trade-union or economic struggles: After the revolution, trade-union
organizations were absent. The workers were reluctant to set up syndicates,
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principally because of their unpleasant experience with the state-run unions
under the Shah and the lack of free and independent trade-union organization.
Thus the Shurahs also had to play the role of typical labor unions in fighting
for economic demands.
2. Struggles against authoritarian relations in the production and admin-
istrative enterprises: Authoritarian relations are a predominant characteristic
of a factory system based upon the capitalist division of labor. In Iran, the
despotic attitude of traditional management was an additional dimension in
industrial relations. Thus the councils tended to struggle against these
relations by attempting to alter them. The workers' general assemblies put
on trial and sacked the elements responsible for maintaining such relations:
directors, foremen, SAVAK agents, and so on. For this purpose, the councils
formed "investigation committees" and factory tribunals to investigate cases
of misconduct and corruption. These activities were undertaken, for example,
in Pars Metal, Arj, Yamaha, and the Phillips companies.
3. Control over hiring and firing: Two motives were behind the workers'
struggles to control this area of managerial authority. The first, the principal
incentive, was related to the idea of "sovereignty of people over their own
destiny," as indicated in the constitutions of the Shurahs prepared by the
workers themselves. The second motive, the practical one, involved achieving
the right to fire (e.g., the managers) and to prevent victimization of the
workers.
4. Control over the financial affairs of the workplace: This concern related
to the workers' determination to have access to the financial information
of the companies and to monitor the flow of resources. The workers wanted
to know how much was being produced, how many profits or losses there
were, where the profits went, to whom the products were sold, and how
much was being reinvested.
5. Management of production and administration of production: This
concern pertained to the high degree of control wielded by the Shurahs.
Control at this sphere rendered the management, appointed by the govern-
ment, virtually redundant. In factories such as Earfoo, Saka, Behpoush, and
the Alborz Electrical Industry, the councils declared themselves as "solely
responsible for the company." That is, the workers regarded themselves as
having the right to preside over distribution, finance, administration, com-
munications, pricing, the purchase of raw materials, production, cultural
affairs, and security. The case of the Phillips Company is a good example.
"What do all these have to do with the workers?" I asked a council member
in a modern plant. He replied:
The reason the revolution was made at all is because we wanted to become
our own masters, to determine our own destiny. . . . We didn't want a situation
where one person or a few make decisions for two thousand. When we, two
thousand, are working around these walls, we want to know what is going
on here; what we'll achieve in the future, in what direction we are running
the company, how much we could take for ourselves, how much we could
contribute to government for national investment. For this reason, we never
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let management employ somebody to make decisions. This would be a repetition
of the same previous mistakes to the extent that it would violate the rights
of the workers, which are in fact the rights of the Iranian nation.
Wider Social and Ideological Implications. So far, I have focused on the
means by which the council movement contributed to the democratization
of the workplace. Now I want to discuss the third level at which the councils
affected and could have had further impacts on democracy in Iran if they
had survived. In striving to restructure the production process and to alter
the inherited relations of subordination and hierarchy, the workers found
themselves experiencing new terrains of control and power status previously
in the exclusive domain of managers. As they functioned in this learning
process, their perceptions of work, power, and society tended to change.
Such an experience would confer on the workers a new perception of their
role in society such that they would be seen not just as a subordinated and
exploited people but as those with the right and ability to determine the
direction of production. This change in perception, if sustained, would have
been immensely significant in social terms. For it would have involved not
only the workers in thinking differently about themselves and about other
classes but also the rest of the civil society, notably the dominant classes,
in acquiring different attitudes toward the workers. The workers would no
longer have been identified as subordinate, miserable, crippled, and regrettable
creatures, but as human beings with initiative and ability. This change of
attitudes would also have acted against the exclusivist view that the sub-
ordinate classes neither need, deserve, nor understand democracy.
In the first six months after the Revolution, a kind of "control from
below" prevailed. However, the real power of the councils began to be
undermined when the provisional government started to implement its
economic policies and to reestablish the one-man management system at
workplaces by appointing professional managers from above. This second
period began in the late summer of 1979 and lasted until July 1981. During
this time, the industrial workplace became the scene of widespread struggles
and tensions between various organs of power: professional management,
Islamic (or maktabi) management, Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), Islamic
Associations, independent councils (the subject of the present chapter), and
the Islamic Shurahs. The latter were set up by the pro-IRP workers and
backed firmly by the Islamic Republic party as a loyal alternative to the
independent Shurahs. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain the
logic behind those tensions and the changing composition of the alliances
within the power struggles. It is enough to state that among these rivals
the independent councils were incrementally undermined. We turn next to
a discussion of the causes behind their disintegration.
Causes of the Shurahs' Disintegration
Political Pressure
The political factor underlying the dissolution of the councils concerns
the attitudes of both the state and capital toward the Shurahs. Although
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(for the reasons mentioned earlier) the relationship between the Islamic state
and the capitalists have long remained contradictory, proponents of both
expressed their opposition to the workers' councils primarily because of
the anti-authoritarian orientation of the councils.
Different factions in the Islamic state adopted different attitudes at different
times toward the Shurahs. The provisional government categorically opposed
their formation. Instead, it advocated the establishment of syndicates. The
provisional government set up a Special Force inside the plants, composed
of appointed inspectors, to report on the activities of the councils.
The populist faction of the IRP known as the "Imam's Line" aimed at
creating a form of "Islamic corporatism" in order to integrate labor into
the Islamic state. In general, corporatism is a form of populist strategy that
attempts to integrate the tripartite forces of labor, capital, and the state in
order to make them work cooperatively for the good of a "beloved nation."
Cooperatism in Iran featured such additional ingredients of Islamic ideology
as the corporatism of Islamic workers, mashru ("legitimate") capitalism,
maktabi (literally, "Islamic") management, and the Islamic state, all of which
cooperated for the common cause of the nation. By attempting to adopt
such a policy, the IRP strengthened the notion of shuraism (albeit with an
Islamic character) and employed it both in the workplace and in society at
large in order to discredit the values and the elements that it considered
"liberal." The policy also aimed to preempt the socialist ideas and orga-
nizations with which the idea of shuraism had been intertwined. The policy,
in practice, also weakened the position of workers by dividing the councils
into "Islamic" and "non-Islamic." The nonconformist councils were later
dismantled.
The "fundamentalist" faction of the IRP, the Hojjatiyeh sect, believed
that the very concept of Shurahs was irrelevant to Islam and should be
abolished altogether. The sect argued that power in Islam emanates from
above, from God through the mediation of the imam and in his absence
through the naib imam (the substitute of imam on earth). Shurahs were
un-lslamic because they constituted an institution of power from below. In
1981, Ahmad Tavakkoli, the then minister of labor and a follower of the
Hojjatiyeh sect, prohibited the formation of the new Islamic Shurahs for a
year. But the workers' resistance and the power struggle within the state
led to his dismissal. Ayatollah Khomeini himself largely shared the view of
Hojjatiyeh on the issue of the Shurahs, a fact that observers consider to
be the main reason for the conflict that existed between him and Ayatollah
Taleghani, who advocated the formation of Islamic councils.16
The practical implication of the policies mentioned above assumed different
forms: (1) an economic blockade, through which (given its overwhelming
control over the banking system, credit, loan, import-export operations, and
so on) the state was able to bring such non-conformist Shurahs in Saka,
Orkeedeh Chinee, Naz Nakh, the Esfahan Wool Industry, among others, to
their knees; and (2) blatant political crackdowns by means of intimidation,
framing, firing, arresting, and so on, which became common practices. This
policy assumed a new momentum after the events of July 1981, when the
clergy seized the state apparatus following President Bani Sadr's downfall.
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The political crackdowns were devastating blows to the structure and
activities of the independent councils. It would be a mistake, however, to
attribute the disintegration of the councils wholly to political factors. I
maintain that the internal contradictions of the councils should be considered
the major factor responsible for their failure. In other words, for the reasons
stated above, the real (versus the formal) power of the Shurahs would have
been undermined, even in the absence of political pressure.
Internal Contradictions
The internal contradictions that led to the councils' dissolution consisted
of conflict between the short-term and long-term interests of the councils.
The workers who had fought so dramatically against the professional managers
and the system they represented, who had put the managers on trial and
dismissed them on several occasions, and who had been running the
companies for months requested the state to send back these same
professional managers to solve certain problems. This contradiction in the
workers' behavior toward the managers reflected the dual function of the
management task: "Coordination" and "control" corresponded respectively
to the technical and social divisions of labor in the production process. The
function of coordination is related to the technical coordination of the
affairs—that is, to the maintenance of harmony, avoidance of waste and
the like—which is required in all complex forms of organization. The function
of control, on the other hand, is the manifestation of power relations in the
production process and is historically determined and specific to authoritarian
forms of organizations. The two functions can be separated only at the level
of abstraction. In reality, they reproduce each other.
Now, the workers wanted to transform the existing management system.
In so doing, however, they felt that they needed, in the short run, the skills
of professional managers in order to maintain production. But the rein-
statement of the very same managers meant, in fact, reestablishment of
the same technical and social (power) relations. So the workers both wanted,
and at the same time did not want, the existing management system. Thus,
on the one hand, restructuring or modifying the existing system of the
division of labor was essential to the survival of the councils in the long
run. The consolidation of the councils therefore required new relations and
a new system of management. On the other hand, their short-run survival
depended on the same traditional forms of managerial competence. In short,
the councils wanted the same managerial functions without the associated
power relations; but this desire obviously could not be realized because in
the hierarchical structure of management, each agent carries, within his or
her position, a specific degree of power that is exerted objectively.
The immediate implication of this contradiction for the Shurahs was the
general weakening of their real power and their transformation into institutions
that had only formal power. From the time of the U.S. Embassy seizure in
late 1979 and the government's growing concern with "rationalizing" industry,
the executive power of the councils tended to change gradually from
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determination of the organization of work and production to consultation
and cooperation with the management. The rapid demise of the independent
councils started just after the political crackdown of July 1981, following
which the pro-IRP Islamic Shurahs and the Islamic Associations dominated
the workplace.17
Conclusion
I have attempted to explore the relationship between the labor movement
and democracy in post-revolutionary Iran by assessing this relationship at
two "immediate" and "mediated" (or indirect) levels of impact of labor upon
the realization of democratic practices. My argument is that the workers'
movement, embodied in the council organizations, contributed to the cause
of democracy by establishing democratic institutions and a nascent democratic
tradition at the workplace. The labor movement, however, failed to act as
an effective force to maintain the political democracy that had been generated
in the aftermath of the Revolution.
Having witnessed the "Islamic Revolution" and its outcome, we may once
again find it possible to observe the establishment of democracy in Iran in
the future. In that case, the question of how to maintain political democracy
would certainly be the major issue, because the historical and structural
factors constraining the practice of democracy will be present: weak capital,
transitory classes, and a backward state. At this time, not much can be
said about the way in which political democracy may be reproduced in Iran
in the future. But what can be said at this stage is that democracy, whether
at the societal or the local ones, cannot be maintained by the good will of
the political leaders, however sincere their intentions may be. The future
political system must be structured in such a way as to be able to afford
the practice of democracy. Democracy can be maintained only through the
establishment of a necessary balance among the conflicting forces in society:
capital, labor, and the state in their totality.
Restriction or even abolition of market relations does not automatically
lead to a democratic structure. Besides, as far as Iran is concerned, market
relations are likely to remain even after another revolutionary upheaval.
Thus, the creation of popular, independent, and grass-roots organizations
seems essential to the generation and maintenance of that necessary balance.
In this process, the experience of labor councils in industry, the service
sector, state administration, and educational establishments, as well as the
councils in local neighborhoods and among the ethnic minorities, would be
of immense value. Among these, the grass-roots and independent labor
councils can play a vital role, for they are able to contribute to the cause
of democracy both directly (as unified organizations of working people) and
indirectly (as democratic institutions in which employees would experiment,
practice, and learn democracy in a systematic way).
Two points must be made in this regard. First, the objective feasibility
and systematic operation of these mass organizations could only be the
54 Asset Bayât
preconditions and products of a political order that will transcend class and
elite rule. Second, there must also exist a clear vision of how to construct
the necessary balance of social forces to maintain the political democracy.
If it is true that mass and grass-roots organizations are essential for the
creation of that balance and, thus, for the democratization of Iranian society
in the future, then one must have a clear idea of how to reproduce the
real power of such mass organizations (such as the factory councils). The
answer to the above question lies in the future, in the process of experience,
and partly in the present—specifically, in the construction of a theory of
"power from below," at both the "micro" and the "macro" levels.
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